Towards a security community for the Mediterranean

The Multiple Identities of the Middle East
A briefing by Bernard Lewis
November 16, 1999

extract from the middle east forum website

What does it mean to be haunted by one's past? Bernard Lewis focused on this question and its relevance to the Middle East in a recent lecture in the Albert Wood Lecture Series. A number of issues concerning this topic were discussed.

History's Role in the Middle East Conflict. While we are all haunted by our pasts to a certain extent, the peoples of the Middle East have a very special sense of history which is much longer, much more active and much more detailed than in the West. This does not make it any more accurate, however. As a result, governments are able to invoke historical myth and legend, rather than fact, as part of their propoganda machine. History is studied and understood not for its own sake but, rather, for its usage in the political arena. The Middle East stands in stark contrast to America where a sense of history, is virtually absent from public consciousness.

Periods of Western Involvement in Middle Eastern History. The role of Western domination in the Middle East, which began in 1798 and concluded in 1991, is divided into a variety a stages. The first of these was the period of Anglo-French rivalry in which Napoleon and Admiral Nelson of the British Royal Navy were the primary figures. This imperialist period taught the Arab states several important historical lessons. Chief amongst these was the realization that the barbarous infidels of the West could defeat the armies of Allah with very little difficulty and could, in turn, occupy and govern their societies. The Arabs also learned that only a Western power was strong enough to upset the rule of another one. Anglo-Russian rivalry marked the second stage of Western involvement in the Middle East. The third period consisted of the great struggle between the allies and the axis powers in World War II which was followed by the last phase - the Cold War.

The Gulf War. The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1991 and the ensuing Western military response is historically significant for two main reasons. First, it symbolized the end of the Cold War rivalry and thus, the end of either American or Soviet domination of the Middle East. Russia is incapable, today, of playing the imperial role and the United States is unwilling. The Gulf War, which began as an inter-Arab war, also signified the death of panArabism - i.e, the belief that the Arabs form one nation and should thus unite to form one Arab state. The Gulf War, thus, marked the beginning of a new era in Middle East history whereby domination and responsibility, for the first time, no longer lie with outside powers. It remains to be seen whether or not Arab governments are willing to grasp this new political situation and act accordingly.

The Peace Process. There are several historical factors which made the peace process possible. First and foremost was the decline of the USSR and, thus, the absence of a rival power to oppose the signing of the accords. Second was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the realization by Arab governments that its member cells constitute a greater threat than Israel ever did. The third factor was exhaustion and the growing awareness by both sides that the military option was not a viable long-term solution. The "deArabization" of the conflict, signified by the Gulf War and the end of panArabism is the final reason. There are also a number of factors mitigating against The peace process. The first of these is internal opposition on both the Israeli and the Arab side, particularly, the growing power of religious fundamentalism. The second is the difference in culture and perception between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The latter places great emphasis on dignity, courtesy and respect while the former does not.

American National Interest in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the primary interest of the United States was to prevent the Soviets from dominating the region. The Middle East is an important place both because of its oil and because of its geo-strategic location, situated at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa. Today, America's interests are Israel and oil. While Israel is less strategically important now than it was during the Cold War, it retains strong sentimental, political, religious and institutional ties to the United States. The main danger concerning oil is its possible monopolization by Iraq which would give Saddam Hussein great strategic, political and economic power.

Olivier Carré (sous la dit. de), L'islam et l'État dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1982

Il existe une communauté d'attitudes et de sentiments à travers le monde musulman. Outre les mêmes grandes confréries, il y a en premier lieu une solidarité internationale de ce qu'on peut appeler l'appareil de l'lslam. Certes, il n'y a pas de clergé en Islam au sens d'une hiérarchie disposant des pouvoirs sacramentels d'une Eglise, qui découlent de la croyance en une Incarnation de la divinité. Mais, évidemment, il y a un personnel spécialisé dans les tâches du culte et de la doctrine. Voilà donc un réseau, à travers le monde musulman, de « savants ('ulamâ'), de « juristes » (fuqahâ'), de « chefs de la prière » (imâm-s) dans les innombrables mosquées ou sanctuaires, de « prédicateurs » du vendredi (khatib, wu'âzz), dé juges (qâdi-s) en matières musulmanes. De tous les problèmes pratiques et intellectuels, juridiques et politiques, qui se présentent à ce personnel, il est discuté et décidé dans des réunions internationales, Congrès de savants et de juristes, Conférences des chefs d'Etat musulmans ou de leurs ministres. L'UNIVERSITÉ islamique de l'Azhar au Caire est considérée comme le centre intellectuel de la pensée musulmane dans tous les domaines. Le poids financier croissant de l'Arabie Saoudite, joint aux lieux saints du pèlerinage annuel à La Mecque et Médine, donne aussi de plus en plus d'importance à ce pays : il devient le centre de cette internationale musulmane dont nous parlons. Témoin le projet d'Université gigantesque à Riyad, en cours d'édification.
Le réveil politique musulman aujourd'hui a son origine dans un mouvement réformiste modéré, ambigu, assez étranger aux sciences modernes, qui s'est produit et diffusé au cours ou à la fin du siècle dernier et qui est aujourd'hui à peu près intégralement récupéré par une tendance plutôt fondamentaliste que réformiste, intégriste que moderniste. Contrairement à ce que crurent certains des réformistes eux-mêmes, il ne fut nullement question d'un mouvement intellectuel et organisationnel comparable, même de loin, à la Réformation en Europe au seizième siècle, à la philosophie des lumières du dix-huitième siècle, ou à la crise du modernisme dans le catholicisme aux débuts du vingtième siècle. L'adaptation au monde moderne est plutôt fondée sur un compromis, non sur une conversion intellectuelle. Il faut simplement, dit-on, adopter les sciences et les techniques de l'Occident sans arriêrisme superstitieux, mais préserver intégralement le bloc des croyances musulmanes et de leurs applications juridiques et sociales. On accueille le progrès technique, pourvu qu'il ne modifie pas sensiblement les croyances, les mentalités, les structures sociales et surtout familiales.

Nissim Rejwan, Arabs face the modern world : religious, cultural, and political responses to the West, Gainesville, Univ.Press of Florida, 1998

Intellectuals have always been a subject of controversy in the Arab world, and the intellectual's role in society and politics remains at issue among the educated classes there. The eruption of the Gulf crisis with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in 1990 served only to intensify the debate, with some academics and writers taking sides in favor of this side or that.
In Egypt, especially, intellectuals came under heavy fire—and from all directions. Groups and circles opposed to Iraq's move attacked those who showed sympathy or even leniency toward Baghdad, while they tried to defend their stand as best they could, considering they were swimming against the tide and against their country's position.
More interesting and instructive have been the sharp exchanges between the intellectuals themselves. Mutual recriminations and accusations were thrown around, and Julien Benda's famous work on "the treason of the intellectuals" was presented as proof and justification for the critics' stand. Things came to such a pass, indeed, that 'Abdul 'Azim Ramadhan, a respected Egyptian historian, found fit to introduce an article he wrote on the failure of the Arab Left with a disclaimer. He announced that he had never worked for, or been associated with, any Kuwaiti institution, academic, governmental, or journalistic—the implication being that in opposing Baghdad's seizure of the emirate, he had no ax to grind.27
The subject is also tackled in calmer and more academic ways. "Defined in any way one chooses, the Arab intellectual is part of the Arab predicament," says Sa'deddine Ibrahim, professor of sociology at the American University of Cairo and one of the more active and outspoken Egyptian intellectuals writing and lecturing in the 1990s.
"As intellectuals," Sa'deddine adds in an interview published in the Cairo weekly Rose el-Yusuf, "we may have erred sometimes, perhaps most of the time. Perchance we lacked courage and thus betrayed our people, being their vanguard and consciences; perhaps we failed in our analyses and our perceptions of our present condition, allowing this to blur our vision and paralyze us. It may be, too, that we have traded our integrity for a livelihood, freedom for social justice, independence for material growth, traditionalism for modernity . . . Perhaps, perhaps. . . ."

Maxime Rodinson, L'islam : politique et croyance, Paris, Fayard, 1993

En Islam, le facteur fondamental qui favorise un recours à l'intégrisme politique est la constitution de la communauté des fidèles, par suite des conditions historiques de sa formation initiale, en une structure politico-religieuse. En cela la différence se marque avec le christianisme qui, en vertu d'autres conditions d'origine, a presque toujours créé des structures doubles — même si elles étaient étroitement alliées —, la communauté des fidèles n'ayant en principe pas de vocation proprement politique. Le royaume du Christ n'est pas de ce monde, il faut rendre à César ce qui est à César et remettre à Dieu ce qui revient à Dieu.
Dans la pratique, cela a abouti souvent à des résultats analogues. Les doctrines cèdent aux exigences de la réalité. On a tort de l'oublier et de faire retomber les responsabilités de toute la pratique sur les dogmes. Mais ces fondements de départ ne sont quand même pas sans efficace. Les origines ont ici et là été idéalisées. Mais le retour aux sources peut être, dans le christianisme, le retour aux conditions plus ou moins mythifiées d'un groupe de croyants fervents bien loin de César et des structures politiques césariennes inévitablement démoniaques. Pendant trois siècles, avant Constantin, l'Eglise a crû sans chercher à contrôler l'Etat, sans y penser même en général. Dans l'Islam, retourner aux sources, c'est en revenir aux conditions encore plus mythifiées de Médine entre 622 et 632, lorsque le Prophète était (comme l'imposaient les conditions de l'Arabie d'alors) le chef d'une communauté de croyants qui revêtait en même temps les aspects d'un Etat en formation. Il transmettait les révélations de Dieu, à la fois sur les mystères de la création et sur les dispositions à prendre pour le bien d'une communauté en lutte avec d'autres structures politiques (les tribus), affrontée chaque jour à des problèmes concrets, matériels à résoudre.

hilal khashan, Arab at the crossroads. Political identity and nationalism, Gainesville, Univ. Press of Florida, 2000

The Arabs, having wallowed in a continuous ideological mire for more than two hundred years, find themselves surrounded by gloom as they trudge into a new century unprepared to deal with its challenges. A long journey to determine a valid identity linking them to the modern age has finally completed a full cycle of vain search. The contemporary surge of militant Islam, after other modes of governance have been unsuccessfully attempted, demonstrates the predicament plaguing the Arab World's ruling elites. A legacy of defeat, a sense of helplessness, endless divisions on every aspect of social and political subjects, unruly publics, and overwhelming state repression and violation of basic human rights do not invite much hope in an unfolding era of economic globalization and steady political openness. The Arabs must make their exit from the past without divorcing themselves from it. They need not relinquish the roots of the much-valued Arab-Islamic culture; however, they need to invigorate it with new values and modes of behavior to make possible their transition toward modernity and beyond. The list of important steps that they must take in the years ahead include (1) understanding the West, (2) believing in the myth of Arab nationalism, (3) defining and pursuing collective objectives, (4) nurturing respect for authority, and (5) realizing the inevitability of political representation. To relieve themselves of the self-perceived sense of siege, the Arabs must graciously accept the fact that the West has convincingly won after a millennium of confrontation against Arab Muslims.1 This is certainly not an invitation to divest themselves of their religio-cultural traditions but to integrate in their thinking certain functional requisites that made the West reach its pinnacle of societal and economic achievements. This makes understanding the West a matter of utmost urgency for Arabs puzzled by the requirements of modernity.

Ali Oumlil, "L'Etat-nation dans la pensée réformiste arabe contemporaine", in Peuples Méditerranéens, n° 27-28, avr.-sept. 1984, pp.57-61

On se propose ici de montrer comment et dans quelles conditions le type d'Etat qu'on appelle Etat moderne ou Etat-nation a été conçu par les penseurs arabes réformistes depuis le début du siècle dernier. Il faut préciser que le souci de ces derniers n'était pas purement théorique : pour eux, l'Etat moderne ne se dissociait pas des Etats européens qui exerçaient une pression sur leur pays et intervenaient en tant qu'appareils de colonisation.
Ces penseurs arabes ont vis-à-vis de la pensée politique grecque une position différente de celle de leurs ancêtres. Al-Farabi pensant à la cité idéale, ou Miskawayh traitant de l'éthique dans un esprit aristotélicien, n'avaient pas devant eux le type de société ou d'Etat auquel renvoyait la pensée des Grecs. Ce qui leur a permis d'en rester à une pure réinterprétation de cette pensée et de l'appréhender sur le plan proprement idéologique.
Il en va tout autrement pour les écrivains arabes modernes ; lorsque ces derniers parlent de la « constitution », de « l'organisation fiscale », de « l'instruction publique », bref, de tout ce qui se rapporte à la gestion et au contrôle de la société par un Etat moderne, ils ne le font pas seulement à partir d'une simple préoccupation intellectuelle. On ne saurait donc faire abstraction de la conjoncture de pression et de domination qui a accompagné l'introduction dans les pays arabes des idées et des structures relatives à l'Etat moderne.

Georges Corm, L’Europe et l’Orient. De la balkanisation à la libanisation, histoire d’une modernité inaccomplie, Paris, La découverte, 1989

Le combat contre la violence qui continue de secouer le Proche-Orient n'est pas de ceux qui se gagnent à l'échelle d'une génération. Lorsque la guerre est le résultat des myopies et des passions accumulées au cours des siècles, comment la paix pourrait-elle resurgir sans le travail du temps ? Travail mystérieux, enfantement douloureux où la mort et la vie de communautés humaines se jouent au fil du hasard et de la nécessité, de la loi du plus fort mais aussi de la passion pour la justice.
Myopies et passions seront dans cet ouvrage celles des enchevêtrements de l'Orient arabe et de l'Europe depuis les débuts du XIX siècle. Nous avions déjà décrit cet Orient assoupi durant des siècles à l'ombre de la puissance ottomane, puis jeté sans ménagement dans le tourbillon du XX siècle, ayant perdu tous ses codes traditionnels de référence. Ce fut l'objet du Proche-Orient éclaté que de montrer les déphasages culturels du monde arabe ', la diversité des situations vécues, la fulgurance des changements socio-économiques locaux induits par l'évolution de l'économie internationale, en particulier sur le plan énergétique, achevant les déstructurations initiées au XIX siècle par l'industrie européenne triomphante. Nous avions aussi évoqué les myopies et passions occidentales à l'endroit de l'Orient arabe depuis l'expédition de Suez en 1956 jusqu'à l'invasion du Liban par Israël en 1982 et tous les événements dramatiques qui en ont découlé. Elles seront aussi celles de l'Europe, du monde « civilisé » qui, à la veille du grand marché unique européen, prétend ne pas se laisser détourner de ce stade ultime de paix, de raison et de prospérité, par les éclaboussements terroristes de la « barbarie » orientale. Dans Géopolitique du conflit libanais2, nous avions déjà évoqué cette myopie, montré que les racines locales du conflit, si banalement et si dérisoirement humaines, ne pouvaient par elles-mêmes expliquer le niveau monstrueux de violence sur un aussi petit territoire. Nous avions alors brièvement exposé les profondeurs historiques et géopolitiques de la déstabilisation régionale et la complexité de leurs liens avec les différents niveaux de l'identité libanaise.
L'accueil positif reçu par ces deux ouvrages m'a poussé à élargir le cercle de l'analyse, à baliser plus profondément les causes de la violence au Moyen-Orient. Ce faisant, m'est apparue en lumière crue l'intensité des liens unissant depuis la fin du Moyen Age l'histoire de l'Europe à celle du Proche et Moyen-Orient, liens marqués par deux grands mouvements : la Première Guerre mondiale et l'écroulement de l'Empire ottoman, puis la Seconde Guerre mondiale et l'Holocauste qui permettent la consolidation de l'existence d'un État israélien en Palestine, inconcevable un siècle plus tôt. Sont apparus aussi, à travers cette recherche, les mille liens d'une géopolitique incontournable, centrée sur le bassin méditerranéen, les conflits de ses pays riverains et sa place mouvante dans l'ordre international. L'œuvre éminente de Fernand Braudel sur la Méditerranée au temps de Philippe II ou sur la civilisation matérielle et le capitalisme l'a démontré avec le plus grand talent et la plus étonnante érudition.

Hichem Djaït, Culture et politique dans le monde arabe, in H. Algar, Islam et politique au Proche-Orient aujourd'hui, Paris, Gallimard, 1999

Le rêve unitaire est un rêve de l'État unifié, celui de la grande Nation. Pourquoi l'État? Parce que la conception de l'État, en dehors de la seule Europe occidentale, est celle d'une entité structurant la société et même la créant. Une telle conception est répandue partout dans le tiers monde, Israël compris, et bien évidemment dans le monde communiste. Faut-il rappeler que c'était aussi le cas de l'Amérique, à l'époque fondatrice. Le thème de la réalité de la Oumma théorisé par des penseurs nationalistes aussi différents que Sata' al-Hosri et Michel 'Aflaq, est un thème clos, puisque cette réalité est considérée comme un fait acquis. Disons que ce fut une conquête destinée à s'enraciner de plus en plus dans le réel à mesure que l'espace arabe, nolens, volens, est appelé à intensifier ses relations internes, à détruire ses particularismes comme sont en train de se détruire les idiomes vernaculaires. Supposons que par l'effet d'une baguette magique, un État arabe se fonde, fédéral comme il se doit, s'étendant du Golfe à l'Atlantique selon la formule consacrée : il viendra coiffer un ensemble humain qui n'est pas plus hétérogène que la société américaine d'aujourd'hui. Le problème est donc essentiellement politique et, paradoxalement, historique : une barrière quasiment infranchissable. Non pas de culture politique, mais de réalités solides comme un roc. Non pas d'indigence dans les mythes fondateurs : il y en a au moins deux qui sont d'une puissance redoutable, le mythe de la civilisation arabe ancienne, occulté mais présent, le mythe de la saga nationaliste (guerres anticolonialistes, nassérisme, luttes contre l'impérialisme et le sionisme...). Mais il s'agit précisément du centre du problème : celui de l'État. Or toute analyse du passé, lointain et proche, comme celle du présent, va à l"encontre de la possibilité d'un État arabe unitaire. Ne reste que le futur, c'est-à-dire l'utopie, le wish-ful thinking, le rêve, mais un rêve qui peut être pernicieux. Regardons le passé : l'État « arabe » du prophète, des premiers califes, des Omeyyades et des premiers Abbassides, était fondé non sur un dessein de type national ou racial, mais sur l'Islam. La Oumma, c'était la nation islamique, même si au départ les Arabes coïncidaient avec l'islam dans les faits. D'un autre côté, l'Empire arabo-islamique dans sa phase classique, en dépit de l'unification profonde opérée sur l'espace du Dâr-al-islâm7, s'est greffé sur des domaines particularisés à l'extrême depuis toujours : l'Egypte, la Mésopotamie, la Syrie, l'Afrique, sans compter la Perse. Il s'est trouvé que, dans une phase donnée de l'histoire, des empires à prétention universelle se sont formés, pour la première fois d'ailleurs dans l'histoire du monde - et ce n'est pas un fait fortuit -, avec l'émergence de religions universelles. Une phase qui a duré un peu plus d'un millénaire (en gros de - 500 à + 500), dont l'Islam comme Empire et comme religion a constitué le dernier chaînon : de Cyrus à Mohammad. Il est capital d'observer que la montée des religions universelles accompagnait la montée des empires mais qu'elle ne les fondait pas. L'Empire favorisait la naissance de telles religions, celles-ci à leur tour soutenaient l'Empire par une forte armature spirituelle, mais le chemin de l'un à l'autre pouvait être long comme dans le cas du christianisme et de l'Empire romain. L'islam a achevé - ou inversé ? - le processus : la religion fonde directement l'Empire. Mais de même qu'après l'islam, il n'y aura plus de nouvelle religion universelle, de même après l'éclatement du Califat abbasside (autour de 800), il n'y aura plus de vrais empires. Toutes les entités qui se sont dénommées empires jusqu'à la guerre de 1914 ont été de pseudo-empires, épigones des anciens, c'est le cas notamment de l'Empire romain germanique et de l'Empire ottoman.

Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977

Without legitimacy, argued Max Weber, a ruler, regime, or governmental system is hard-pressed to attain the conflict-management capability essential for long-run stability and good government. While the stability of an order may be maintained for a time through fear or expediency or custom, the optimal or most harmonious relationship between the ruler and the ruled is that in which the ruled accept Tightness of the ruler's superior power.1
The central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy. The shortage of this indispensable political resource largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable character of all the present Arab governments. If one were called upon to describe the contemporary style of politics in the Arab world—a region that stretches from Morocco to Kuwait, organized into eighteen sovereign states (excluding Mauritania and Somalia, which recently joined the Arab League) embracing some 125 million people—the adjectives that immediately spring to mind include mercurial, hyperbolic, irrational, mysterious, uncertain, even dangerous. Arab politics today are not just unstable, although instability remains a prominent feature, they are also unpredictable to participants and observers alike. Fed by rumor, misinformation, and lack of information, the Arab political process is cloaked in obscurity and Arab politicians are beset by insecurity and fear of the unknown. If their behavior appears at times quixotic or even paranoid, the irrationality lies less within themselves than in their situation. Whether in power or in the opposition, Arab politicians must operate in a political environment in which the legitimacy of rulers, regimes, and the institutions of the states themselves is sporadic and, at best, scarce. Under these conditions seemingly irrational behavior, such as assassinations, coups d'etat, and official repression, may in fact derive from rational calculations. The consequence of such behavior, which itself stems from the low legitimacy accorded to political processes and institutions, contribute further to the prevailing popular cynicism about politics. These consequences, so dysfunctional for political development by almost any definition, are all the more damaging when juxtaposed against the revolutionary and nationalist values that are today so widely and intensely held by the Arab people.

Eric Rouleau & Said Edward, Information and misinformation in Euro-Arab relations: lectures, December 17 1988, The Hague, Lutfia Rabbani Found., 1988

Information is knowledge. Knowledge leads to mutual understanding, and mutual understanding is basic to co-operation. While it is usual in assemblies such as this to emphasize the positive aspects of Euro-Arab relations, I think that the relationship is too important to allow for any complacency. It is true that relations between the two communities are important. We have common interests. These interests are real, they are significant, they are growing and they are bound to develop further. However, it would be self-deceiving to see only one face of the coin. It is true that over the centuries, trade and cultural interaction have brought Europeans and Arabs closer to each other, but it is also true that wars have been waged, inflicting suffering and bloodshed on both sides. It is true that European colonial powers have introduced forms of modernization, but it is also true that these very colonial powers have introduced economic exploitation, forms of oppression, and unfortunately, ethnic contempt…
Journalists, scholars and intellectuals often see themselves as being objective in their work. Indeed, many of them are honest and hard working. They try to grasp realities and they try to be impartial. But are they really free from preconceived ideas, from prejudice? To what degree is their perspective influenced or determined by their family background, their upbringing, the books they have read, the dominant ideology in their environment? And what about the collective conciousness of their community?
I would say that even a photographer is largely subjective. The kind of picture he takes depends on the kind of lens he uses. It depends on the intensity of the light which he projects. It also depends on the angle with which he takes the picture. It depends on his mood and, consciously or unconsciously, the degree of sympathy or antipathy which he feels towards his subject might be reflected in his pictures. We ought to remember well how one and the same person can look so differently in pictures taken by two or three different photographers.
No media operator can honestly claim to be totally objective. A journalist's report is after all a personal venture. So is the evaluation, the interpretation of events, so is the form, whether these events are presented to readers, listeners, or viewers.
Writers, broadcasters, television producers, not only in Europe and the Arab world, but all over the world are bound to take into account the sensitivity of their audiences, the mentality of the people who are listening to them, seeing them or reading them, the beliefs of their communities, including any prejudices and myths. If they do not, they cease to be communicators. It is in this process of adapting perceived facts to potential audiences that the risks of misinformation and distortion are the greatest. It usually takes not only a lot of talent, but also honesty and courage to communicate unpleasant realities without alienating public opinion…
Fortunately, perceptions are not static. They have improved on both sides for the past few years. Time, experience, and more sophistication on the Arab side have led the European Community in Venice in 1980 to take a clear stand in favor of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and Palestinian self-determination. And most European media today by and large recognize that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a political conflict and should be dealt with as such. The Palestinians in particular have gained their right to be recognized as distinct people and not just as another Arab people…
Parallel progress has been achieved on the Arab side. Reading the Arabic and the European press, I often feel that Arab media project, when they are free to do so, a more accurate image of Europe than the one we get in our media of the Arab world. I can very often see that the Arabs know and understand us better than we understand them. The reasons are simple: the Arabs, like the Third World countries in general, benefit from a substantial flow of information supplied by four Western agencies which practically have the monopoly of news distribution. Therefore the flow from what we call the North to the South is very ample, and it is very scanty the other way around, and therefore the Arabs are much better informed about our societies than we about theirs.
Another thing which is striking is that Arab media operators, whether journalists, writers or television people, are fluent in our languages, be it in English or in French. They have direct access to our publications; they can read them. They have direct access to our societies because they know the languages. When they come to European countries, they are free to move, to interview whoever they choose, to check on their information. One has to admit that European journalists rarely have the same facilities in the Arab World. Another reason why they know us better than we know them is that they take a keener interest in Europe than our peoples take in the Arab World. Take for example the countries of North-Africa. It is striking to see how many people in North-Africa follow, understand, and know about French domestic affairs as much as (even sometimes more than) than the French themselves. Again the reason is simple: people in the Third World feel concerned with what happens in the West because they feel that their fate largely depends on western contingencies: economic, financial, political. It is something refreshing because more knowledge means less bias, and this is something we should register with satisfaction.
Arabs also know us better because they are regular listeners to European broadcasts. Wherever I travel in their region I meet people who listen to the BBC, very often in Arabic. They listen a lot, not only because they are interested in what is happening in our societies, but because very often they distrust their own media. Self-censorship and censorship are unfortunately current in their world.

Du dialogue culturel Euro-Arab. Exigences et Perspectives, Conférence pour le dialogue des cultures, Paris 15-16 Juillet 2002

L'avenir de la culture de la paix
Intervention par Ahmed Youssef Ahmed, Directeur de l'Institut des recherches et des études arabes - Egypte

La charte de l'Unesco s'ouvre par cette phrase : «Comme les guerres naissent dans l'esprit des hommes, c'est dans leur esprit que nous devons édifier les remparts de la paix». Il s'agit là d'une formule d'une profonde signification qui nous rappelle que tout effort pour instaurer une paix véritable ne saurait aboutir pleinement sans une dimension culturelle. Cependant, une interprétation fausse de cette énonciation pourrait priver l'objectif de la construction de la paix du fruit des efforts culturels appropriés et constituer même un obstacle devant la réalisation de la paix et un instrument de destruction de ce qui en a été réalisé.
Le monde arabe constitue un terrain d'expérimentation pour lès efforts tendant à diffuser la culture de la paix, parallèlement aux efforts consentis pour régler le conflit arabo-israélien, l'un des plus complexes et des plus sanglants du monde contemporain. Il ne fait point de doute que les peuples arabes avaient et ont encore, fortement besoin de tels efforts, dès lors qu'ils contribuent à extirper les racines d'un conflit dont ils ont chèrement payé le prix, et a instaurer, en lieu et place, une paix juste à même de les aider à satisfaire aux exigences du progrès et de la prospérité…

2. La culture de la paix, dans les circonstances actuelles : une situation difficile qui change en mal
II ne fait point de doute que les derniers événements, à partir de septembre 2001, nous ont fait passer de la période où les efforts pour diffuser la culture de la paix rencontraient des obstacles, aussi grands fussent-ils, à celle où ils ont subi un cruel revers.
Des bouleversements régionaux se sont conjugués avec les mutations mondiales pour entraîner une dangereuse détérioration de la situation en ce qui concerne le conflit arabo-israélien : D'un côté, le processus d'Oslo s'est retrouvé dans une impasse, après le revirement israélien de 1996, qui a substitué à la période intermédiaire et au règlement définitif prévus par l'Accord d'Oslo, une somme d'idées sans consistance, présentées par les Israéliens comme la solution que les Palestiniens doivent accepter s'ils veulent continuer de profiter des avantages de cette période intermédiaire prévue par les Accords d'Oslo. C'est dans ce sens qu'avaient agi Netanyahu, puis Barak, jusqu'à l'arrivée de Sharon en 2001, qui préconisa clairement et franchement, une conception et une politique destinées à torpiller le processus d'Oslo.
Le résultat en fut le déclenchement de l'Intifadha d'Al-Aqsa, le 28 septembre 2000, expression du refus palestinien de ces solutions minimalistes et de la volonté d'accroître le coût de l'occupation israélienne, de manière à pousser les hommes politiques d'Israël à réviser leurs calculs et à accepter les demandes modérées des Palestiniens.
La répression de l'Intifadha par Israël a atteint des niveaux inconnus jusqu'à présent, avec un recours indiscriminé à la violence, qui généra, en contrepartie, les opérations-suicides. Du point de vue de la culture de la paix, c'est le cercle vicieux.
Une année après le déclenchement de l'Intifadha, survinrent les événements du 11 septembre 2001, aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique, qui eurent pour effet de renforcer la politique américaine visant à établir une distinction nouvelle entre les forces du bien et les forces du mal, distingo dont ont souffert les Arabes, de façon générale, compte tenu de la divergence totale entre Américains et Arabes quant à la définition du terrorisme. Dans l'acception américaine, il ne aurait y avoir de bonne et de mauvaise violence. C'est ainsi que les Etats-Unis ont classé l'ensemble des groupes de résistance palestiniens dans le camp du terrorisme, qu'ils soient ou non adeptes des opérations-suicides. Israël a, du coup, reçu le feu vert pour se livrer à des massacres contre les Palestiniens, qui ont rappelé aux Arabes ce qui s'était passé en 1948.
La situation a empiré, lorsque le Président américain a donné, en juin 2002, sa vision du règlement du conflit arabo-israélien, inscrivant ce conflit dans le processus de lutte contre le terrorisme et considérant que l'obstacle principal à une solution du conflit est le terrorisme palestinien dont l'Autorité palestinienne se fait complice. La solution passe, en conséquence, par le remplacement de cette Autorité. Entre temps, Israël trouvera toujours une excuse pour se défendre contre ce " terrorisme ".
C'est dans un tel climat qui dévoile de manière flagrante la similarité entre les politiques américaine et israélienne, que se propagent les sentiments d'injustice et d'échec dans les milieux arabes, ce qui, loin de constituer un environnement propice à une action en faveur de la culture de la paix, sert au contraire l'instauration d'un climat d'intransigeance, sinon d'extrémisme, où prospère la culture du martyre, dans l'objectif de défendre des droits légitimes que l'ordre mondial et la légalité internationale n'ont pas été à même d'imposer ; un climat ou de nouvelles générations grandissent au contact du conflit arabo-israélien, baignés par les formules et les invectives qui lui sont inhérentes, qu'ils réutilisent après avoir rêvé un jour d'une paix juste ; un climat où toutes les forces pour la défense de la personne et des valeurs morales se mobilisent face à une tentative de diktat imposé à partir du Centre de l'ordre mondial actuel, aux médias et aux systèmes d'enseignement dans le monde arabe.

Richard Gillespie, Europe, the Mediterranean and the Islamists, in R. Gillespie (ed.), Mediterranean Politics, Vol. II, London, Printer, 1996

One of the main objectives of this yearbook is to analyse European responses to the most pressing contemporary problems of the Mediterranean area. Within Europe, it is now quite broadly accepted that instability and conflict to the south and south-east of the continent has direct consequences for political and social stability within the European Union, and that the traditional efforts of the EC to develop a Mediterranean policy have been inadequate and some would say inappropriate. The direct targeting of Europeans by Islamist groups in Algeria and Egypt has underlined the fact that traditional EC policies towards the area have not had the desired effect. Within the European Commission, the urgent calls for a more ambitious response to the problems of the south were expressed in the proposals formulated by Manuel Marin and presented to the European Council at Essen in December 1994.' Warning that political, social and economic problems in a number of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries are 'sources of instability leading to mass migration, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism, drugs and organised crime', harmful both to the area itself and to the Union, the Commission proposed to strengthen the Mediterranean policy by establishing a long-term 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership'.
The proposals involved investing greater European resources in gradual moves towards the establishment of a free trade area, a 'Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area', while at the same time working towards the construction of a security framework for the area, starting with the holding of a general Mediterranean security conference in 1995. The European Council at Essen welcomed the proposals in broad outline, and supported the idea of holding a security conference, but postponed the more difficult decisions on how the new Mediterranean initiative should be financed and to what extent.2 Appropriately it was Spain, which a few years ago played the leading role in drafting the proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), co-sponsored by Italy, that was chosen to host the conference during the Spanish presidency of the EU in the second half of 1995. It is therefore an appropriate time for this yearbook to publish a critical account of some of the deficiencies of existing EC Mediterranean policies. As Alfred Tovias shows, the responsibility for these deficiencies must be distributed fairly widely across the Union. Involved in the standard north-south disagreement within the Union is the northern members' preference for Mediterranean policy to be based on trade concessions, contrasting with the southern members' emphasis on the need for increased financial aid. Both of these postures are based to a considerable extent on self-interest, with the north in the past assigning the Mediterranean a relatively low priority, and certainly not keen to devote substantial public funds to it, and the south insisting upon a reinforcement of the policy directed towards its Mediterranean neighbors, but resisting the trade concessions called for by those neighbors which would be detrimental to domestic agricultural and other interests. Marin's pre-Essen message was that a synthesis of trade concessions and substantially increased aid was vital and most urgently required if the Union was to have any chance of really helping to restore stability to the troubled countries of its Mediterranean periphery.

Hani Habeeb, Le partenariat euro-méditerranéen : apports et limites : le point de vue arabe, Paris, Ed. Publisud, 2003

Le concept de « société civile » a collé, à la fin du vingtième siècle,
aux concepts de démocratie et de développement. La démocratie signifie ici « un outil de gestion de la lutte entre les classes de la société », en admettant l'existence d'une séparation entre elles, sur la base des intérêts des classes et du fonctionnement des dispositifs du pouvoir. Ce concept de démocratie, s'étend à l'appel de mise en place de i changements structurels dans le système politique, économique, social et humain de l'Etat, pour une remise en confiance perdue entre gouvernants et gouvernés, dans un espace de liberté où les gens se rencontrent de leur propre gré en vue d'exprimer leurs volontés communes. L'expression de « société civile » a progressé avec l'évolution des étapes de la lutte des classes dans une société donnée, et l'a dépassée pour atteindre la communauté internationale et devenir, un des outils que le système impérialiste a utilisés, pour la chute du système socialiste et la reconstruction de ses Etats sur le modèle des démocraties occidentales, telle que dénommées par Henry Kissinger… … Les racines de la société civile s'enfoncent profondément dans l'histoire, aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, où elle fut connue sous l'appellation de « contrat social » chez Thomas Hobbes, John Locke et Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Ces penseurs en ont parlé en termes de « société des citoyens libres » qui choisissent de leur propre gré, la forme et les conditions du système de pouvoir dans lequel ils veulent vivre, pour imposer des restrictions au système monarchique et lui retirer la légitimité en cas d'atteinte aux droits des citoyens.
Ce concept est resté en usage, jusqu'à l'apparition de nouvelles conceptions chez Hegel, Marx et Engels, plus globales et plus influentes, ayant conduit à la création d'institutions politiques sociales et économiques intégrées, par la réalisation de l'égalité et la justice entre les membres de la société, dans l'intérêt de l'Etat avec tous ses fondements et sur la base du rejet et de la destruction totale des systèmes politiques et sociaux, qui s'appuient sur le pouvoir absolu d'un individu, qu'il soit roi ou despote.
Ces mouvements nationaux de libération et de renaissance patriotique sont apparus dans les années cinquante du vingtième siècle, tel que le mouvement des non-alignés (la conférence de Bandoeng en 1955).
Les institutions régionales telles que la Ligue des Etats Arabes (1945), l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine (1962), l'Organisation de la Conférence Islamique (1974), ne sont qu'une image innovée de la société civile, en pleine lutte amère menée par les peuples du tiers-monde, durant la période de la guerre froide, entre les deux blocs socialiste et capitaliste, en vue de leur libération politique et économique, la construction de sociétés contemporaines sur des bases juridiques, une justice sociale, la réalisation d'un développement économique et social, accordant à l'homme sa liberté, sa dignité, son humanisme, sans engagement ni contrainte par rapport aux deux blocs ou de dépendance à leur égard…
… Le partenariat euro-méditerranéen malgré ce que d'aucuns peuvent penser, est vital comme l'air et l'eau, de par ses apports positifs en transfert de technologie occidentale et communication entre civilisations, au risque de porter en son sein, une tentative européenne de transformations sur la scène interne des Etats arabes méditerranéens. Cela pouvait aussi s'accompagner d'élargissement de l'aire du pouvoir européen, sécuritaire, politique et économique, ainsi que l'accroissement du volume de son espace géographique avec des adjonctions nouvelles renforçant sa stratégie globale et les équilibres de ses forces concurrentielles.
La société civile telle que représentée par l'Occident est pareille à la mondialisation. La société civile qui convient aux Etats arabes est celle qui s'appuie sur la culture, la civilisation, les croyances, les traditions, les souffrances partagées, politiques et vitales de la Nation Arabe dans son passé, son présent et son avenir. Cette région aspire réaliser ses objectifs, ses ambitions et son message de construction la personnalité, d'unification des énergies et des potentialités, d'édification de l'Etat arabe moderne.
C'est la société civile qui défend les droits humains, civiques populaires dans le cadre de la constitution, des dispositions de la loi de la séparation des pouvoirs, pour protéger l'individu et la société des mesures répressives et arbitraires, et contre l'abus de pouvoir d'un responsable en dehors de l'autorité et de la loi.
C'est l'engagement sur les fondements de l'Etat contemporain garantit la réalisation de la justice, de l'égalité des chances pour citoyens, depuis leur enfance jusqu'à la prise en charge de le) vieillesse.

Tout penchant en faveur de cette approche occidentale de la société civile risque d'être chargé d'une aura éclatante et de conceptions globes nées du foisonnement intellectuel, culturel, matériel et technique occidental, loin des souffrances et des spécificités nationales et patriotiques, dont résulterait une dépendance du faible vis-à-vis du fort et du pauvre par rapport au riche, ainsi qu'une menace contre la personnalité nationale de la région arabe avec plus de recul et de dégradation.
Les Etats méditerranéens risqueraient de se transformer, dans le cadre d'un partenariat euro-méditerranéen injuste et inégal, en une simple force secondaire annexe, qui tourne dans un espace de manœuvres restreintes, et cela malgré tout ce que contient la Déclaration de Barcelone, pour l'établissement de relations égales et parallèles et pour la réalisation d'un développement durable, la réduction des distorsions scientifiques et économiques entre les deux parties du partenariat euro-méditerranéen.

Tareq Ismael, Middle East Politics Today: Government and Civil Society, University Press of Florida, 2001

A major problem in Middle East politics today has been reconciling the western modernization process with the social values of Islam. A serious conflict occurred with the adoption of western penal codes and family law; however, a greater conflict still is the adoption and imitation of certain controversial western social values. This conflict was dealt with in Turkey by divesting the Shari'ah, the religious courts, of their secular authority, resulting in the first real separation of church and state in an Islamic society. Further, it opened the door to government control and led the government to assume the prerogative of changing the social structure whenever its needs and desires run counter to the tenets of Islam. Today this trend is being challenged somewhat by militant Turkish Muslims who advocate a return to some degree of Islamic law. While not opposed to modernization and material advancement, they are troubled by what they see as the western social evils accompanying the process of modernization.

Jean Lacouture, Ghassan Tueni et Gérard D. Khoury, Un siècle pour rien, Paris, Albin Michel, 2002

Un des livres marquants de l’année francophone réunit le dialogue de trois belles intelligences humanistes autour de la question d’Orient : Ghassan Tuéni, Jean Lacouture et Gérard Khoury. Chaucun a de nombreux ouvrages derrière lui, et leurs publications requerraient un livre entier pour les recenser : c’est là une occasion rare de voir tant de talents et de perspectives réunis autour d’une réflexion commune dans un ouvrage de synthèse qui nous concerne de près.
Un Siècle pour rien, conçu comme vade-mecum de l’histoire moderne de l’Orient – et du Liban en particulier, offre bien plus au lecteur qu’un dialogue sur les XIXe et XXe siècles. L’ouvrage est remarquable par la densité et la qualité de ses propos oraux : les auteurs parlent comme on écrit, avec une simplicité accompagnée d’un soufle platonicien. Sans vouloir marquer une hiérarchie contre laquelle nos dialecticiens s’insurgeraient, on a l’impression d’un Banquet contemporain, avec Ghassan Tuéni en maître à penser suave, Gérard Khoury en disciple créatif et Jean Lacouture en choryphée offrant à l’occasion une toile plus générale qui rappelle combien le Moyen-Orient et le Liban s’inscrivent dans la mappemonde trouble. C’est un livre agréable par ses réflexions-surprises, telle la première instance de la formule « Liban, Suisse du Proche-Orient », retrouvée par Gérard Khoury dans un texte en deux volumes commandité par le gouverneur ottoman de Beyrouth au tournant du siècle passé ; Ghassan Tuéni ouvrant une porte soudaine sur « les juifs arabes qui souhaitent que règne au Moyen-Orient une paix leur permettant de revenir en Syrie ou en Irak » ; ou rappelant la perdurance du « pyromane-pompier, une vieille histoire » libanaise remontant au moins aux massacres confessionnels et interventions étrangères de 1860 ; ou encore « l’épuration ethnique » des Palestiniens de 1948, soulignée par Jean Lacouture par une comparaison avec les indigènes d’Amérique ; ainsi que, dans la foulée, l’importance pour les trois de l’État binational comme solution humaniste en Palestine...
La dimension didactique de l’ouvrage nous interpelle au sens pratique du terme : un des grands débats de notre société libanaise, et par extension moyen-orientale, tourne autour de la perception de notre histoire. Chacun, dit-on, la lit à sa manière, et avec la dimension communautaire dominante de l’enseignement privé, et les retards aggravés par la guerre pour l’enseignement public, notre société n’arrive pas à s’entendre sur un livre d’histoire unifié qui permettrait de créer une mémoire collective cimentant cette société fragmentaire qui est la nôtre. Malgré les bons sentiments qui l’animent, cette approche oublie que l’histoire ne peut plus être ainsi présentée après Lucien Febvre et Fernand Braudel, pour ne citer qu’eux. Si l’on veut apprendre l’histoire des États-Unis, le livre des thématiques problématiques d’Éric Foner est bien plus enrichissant que des livres synthétiques qu’on sert aux écoles. L’élusif livre d’histoire unifié condamnerait à la pauvreté intellectuelle, et garantirait la reproduction d’une fausse uniformité qui ne correspond en rien à la trame complexe du Moyen-Orient. Il nous faut, pour rendre compte de la richesse de son histoire et de celle du Liban, comme de toute société, un ou plusieurs livres-souches, des livres-questions plus qu’un livre-réponse.
Dans une lecture impressionniste de l’histoire moderne du Liban et de la région, il semble difficile de trouver un livre qui ferait mieux l’affaire de livre-souche qu’Un Siècle pour rien. Pour le XIXe siècle libanais, au milieu de travaux remarquables qui incluent les publications de Dominique Chevalier, Boutros Labaki, I.M. Similianskaia, Masud Daher, Ilya Harik, plus récemment Ussama Makdisi, Engin Akarli, Leila Fawaz, et bien d’autres, le petit ouvrage de Samir Khalaf (Persistance and Change in 19th Century Lebanon, AUB 1979) offre ce modèle de livre-souche, qui pose des questions de synthèse incorporant l’historiographie mondiale sur le Liban d’il y a deux siècles. Mais le livre de Khalaf reste trop académique, trop dense pour un public non universitaire. Ce n’est pas le cas d’Un Siècle pour rien qui, pour le Liban et la région, fait doublement l’affaire, en une synthèse qu’accompagne la touche socratique d’un didactisme léger : et avec trois voix, on dirait qu’on lit simultanément trois livres.
Il faut donc en hâter la version arabe, et demander à nos professeurs d’histoire, dans le secondaire comme à l’Université, s’il ne convient pas de s’appuyer autant sur les questions que les réponses que cet ouvrage de synthèse adresse à la subtilité du lecteur, pour finir enfin du débat morose sur le livre unifié, et répondre intelligemment et créativement aux interpellations du livre-souche.
Reste le titre du livre, qui appelle commentaire : à voir les sociétés arabes contemporaines dans leur blocage et leur manque de liberté, on sent que l’histoire nous a laissés derrière, et que le siècle passé s’est écoulé pour rien.
Sans doute, mais la maturité que l’on peut déceler dans les modes de réaction à la vie publique chez la plupart des gens honnêtes de la région, et ils sont la majorité, cette maturité même est signe que toutes ces souffrances n’ont pas forcément été pour rien.

Chibli Mallat, L'Orient Le Jour, 20 Octobre 2002

"Realism vs. Cosmopolitanism. A debate between Barry Buzan and David Held, conducted by Anthony McGrew", December 1996

Available on http://www.polity.co.uk/global/realism.htm

David Held, Democracy and the Global Order. From Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995.

Chris Brown, "Theories of International Justice", in British Journal of Political Science, vol. 27, n.2, April 1997, pp. 273-297

Human Security Now, New York, Commission on Human Security, 2003

Available on http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html

Centro EURO-MED

http://www.fscpo.unict.it/euromed/cjmhome.htm

John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, in Katzenstein et al, 1999

John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, in Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D.Krasner, Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp.-215-245.

This is a wonderful account of the flaws of what the author labels as neoutilitarian approaches (neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists) in international relations. Neo-utilitarians, says Ruggie, take as exogenous and given those elements, such as identities and interests, which are so crucial in explaining the dynamics at play in the international realm. The core of the constructivist research, on the other hand, concerns “what happens before the neo-utilitarian model kicks in “ (p. 227).
In order to analyse what’s happening before, “ideational factors” have to be taken seriously into account. Neither neo-realists nor neoliberal institutionalists do that. These last ones, whenever they do take account of these factors, consider them in instrumental terms (useful or not useful in the pursuit of materially-oriented interests).
Ideational factors are indeed important to social life and, being international reality a social sructure (or construct), ideas are also crucial to it. This is especially true in times of change, when “states are struggling to redefine stable sets of interests and preferences regarding key aspects of the international order” (p. 243).
“In summary”, says Ruggie, “ ‘making history’ in the new era is a matter not merely of defending the national interest but of defining it, not merely enacting stable preferences but constructing them. These processes are constrained by forces in the object world, and instrumental rationality os ever present. But they also deeply implicate such ideational factors as identities and aspirations as well as leaders seeking to persuade their publics and one another through reasoned discourse while learning, or not, by trial and error. As a result, nothing makes it clearer that the question of agency at times such as ours why the constructivist approach needs to be part of the theoretical tools of the international relations field” (p. 238)

Italo Calvino, Le città invisibili, Milano, Mondadori, 1993 [ed.or. 1972]

"Nessuno sa meglio di te, saggio Kublai, che non si deve mai confondere la città con il discorso che la descrive"
Le città e i segni. 5 (p. 61)

"No one, wise Kublai, knows better than you that the city must never be confused with the words that describes it".
Invisible Cities, London, Secker & Warburg, 1975 [traslated by William Weaver]

[In the official English translation, the word "discorso" in translated with "words", which we consider slighty confusing, compared to the more literary translantion "discourse"]

Alain Joxe, L'empire du chaos. Les Républiques face à la domination américaine dans l'après-guerre froide, Paris, La Découverte, 2004 (I ed.2002)

"Il faut rénover ces instruments conceptuels [Hobbes' idea of sovereignity as the protection of the people and Clausewitz's idea of the war as the continuation of politics with other means], remettre en forme la définition de la souverainité populaire comme protection et refonder la recherche sur la paix".
Meaning that the best guarantee for the security of the citizens comes from a republican regime, giving the people the possibility to take back in their hands the sovereign power, which has been kidnapped, in favour af a new anti-democratic "aristocracy of the affaires" (aristocratie d'affaires) by the process of globalization (p. 20).

Michel Foucault, L'archeologie du savoir, Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1969

"1. Les conditions pour qu'apparaisse un objet de discours, les conditions
historiques pour qu'on puisse en 'dire quelque chose', et que plusieures personnes
puissent en dire des choses différentes, les conditions pour qu'il s'inscrive
dans un domaine de parenté avec d'autres objets, pour qu'il puisse établir avec
eux des rapports de ressemblence, de voisinage, d'éloignement, de différence,
de trasformation - ces conditions, on le voit, sonts nombreuses et lourdes. Ce
qui veut dire qu'on ne peut pas parler à n'importe quelle époque de n'importe
quoi; il n'est pas facile de dire quelque chose de nouveau; il ne suffit pas d'ouvrir
les yeux, de faire attention, ou de prendre conscience, pour que de nouveaux objets,
aussitôt, s'illuminent, et qu'au ras du sol ils poussent leur première clarté.
Mais cette difficulté n'est pas seulement négative; il ne faut pas la rattacher
à quelque obstacle dont le pouvoir serait, exclusivement, d'aveugler, de gêner,
d'empêcher la découverte, de masquer la pureté de l'évidence ou l'obstination
muette des choses mêmes; l'objet n'attend pas dans les limbes l'ordre qui va le
libérer et lui permettre de s'incarner dans une visible et bavarde objectivité;
il ne préexiste pas à lui-même, retenu par quelque obstacle aux bords premiers
de la lumière. Il existe sous les conditions positives d'un faisceau complexe
de rapports.(p.61) 2. Ces relations sont établies entre des institutions, des
processus économiques et sociaux, des formes de comportements, des systèmes de
normes, des techniques, des types de classification, des modes de caractérisation;
et ces relations ne sont pas présentes dans l'objet; ce ne sont pas elles qui
sont déployées lorsqu'on en fait l'analyse; elles n'en dessinent pas la trame,
la rationalité immanente, cette nervure idéale qui réapparaît totalement ou en
partie lorsqu'on le pense dans la vérité de son concept. Elles ne définissent
pas sa constitution interne, mais ce qui lui permet d'apparaître, de se justaxposer
à d'autres objets, de se situer par rapport à eux, de définir sa différence, son
irréductibilité, et éventuellement son hétérogénéité, bref, d'être placé dans
un champ d'extériorité. (pp. 61-62) [...] 4. "[...] A propos de ces figures
d'ensemble qui, d'une manière insistante mais confuse, se donnaient comme la psychopathologie,
l'économie, la grammaire, la médicine, on s'était demandé quelle sorte d'unité
pouvait bien les constituer: n'étaient-elles qu'une reconstruction d'après coup,
à partir d'oeuvres singulières, de théories successives, de notions ou de thèmes
dont les uns avaient été abandonnés, les autres maintenus par la tradition, d'autres
encore recouverts par l'oubli puis remis au jour? N'étaient-elles qu'une séries
d'entreprises liées? On avait cherché l'unité du discours du côté des objets eux-mêmes,
de leur distribution, du jeu de leurs différences, de leur proximité ou de leur
éloignement - bref du côté de ce qui est donné au sujet parlant: et on est renvoyé
finalement à une mise en relations qui caractérise la pratique discoursive elle-même;
et on découvre ainsi non pas une configuration ou une forme, mais un ensemble
de règles qui sont immanentes à une pratique et la définissent dans sa spécificité."(p.63).

Mohammed Arkoun, Joseph Maïla, De Manhattan à Bagdad. Au-delà du Bien et du Mal , Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 2003

"C'est aussi que les discussions,le perceptions,les interprétations,le vocabulaire utilisé pour lire les événements qui interrogent le monde sont toujours
fixé en Occident. Le monde arabo-musulman ne produit pas de vocabulaire particulier pour analyser, percevoir et
situer les événements,leur donner des qualifications à partir de sa condition historique actuelle et des 'valeurs'
léguées par une tradition islamique tout entiére engluée dans les thématiques et les représentations d'une mytho-
histoire devenue mytho-idéologique"
[p. 152]

First Item

This is the first item in your weblog. Feel free to delete it.

2004 - 04 - 22

**Assumptions of the discourse on security**
Disorder is a fundamental component of international life. Fear and danger necessarily grow from this disorder.	Disorder is a fundamental component of international life. From disorder may grow fear and danger, but also opportunities of cooperation.
Domestic analogy: the international arena corresponds to a pre-contractual state of nature.	Domestic analogy: the international arena corresponds to a pre-contractual state of nature.
Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war. War is a constant possibility.	Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war, but war is only an extreme case of international intercourses.
Individuals are functions of statuality's needs.	Statuality is a function of citizens' needs.

**What security is about**
Territorial integrity of the state and protection of the values expressed by the community living within its borders.	Personal integrity and protection of every human being's "borders" of dignity and respect.
The interplay of geopolitical realities embodied in the states. They are given facts, subject to change (geographical position, demography, energetic sources, raw materials) but in any case measurable in a quantitative terms.	Ever changing challenges coming from the internal and international realm (environmental issues, ethnic tensions, minorities, immigration, financial instability)
Mastering change.	Coping with change.

**The means through which security is granted**
The use of force in the international arena.	The juridification of international space through norms, rules, institutions, and loyalties. Coertion can be centralized or decentralized (Kelsen).
Temporary equilibria between states based on given patterns of relationship such as hegemony and the balance of power, etc	Viability of social,economic and technological constellations (whether formalized or unformal, regimes) based on an efficient and fair distribution of wealth and justice for all men and women (international society as a civitas maxima).
Alliances as the most effective way to cope with fear and desorder.	Regionalization intended as a process towards intergovernamental/supranational cooperation to cope with the problems of wealth and justice or towards functional/ruling cooperation to cope with technological progresses.
In the internal realm, absolute sovereignty increases the possibility to wage an efficient use of force and, therefore, increases the chances of survival of its community into the international arena (Hobbes)	In the internal realm, the de-absolutization of sovereignty is the best guarantee for the security of the citizen - juridification, divisions of power, spacial articulation (federalism), democratization (Kant, Locke)

**The rethoric of security**
The discourses on war (the culture of war)	The discourse on peace (the culture of peace and internationalism)
God as the source of legitimation for the use of force	Legality and rationality as the source of legitimation for the use of force. However, war is considered to be unthinkable within a security system recognized as legitimate by its members.
National interest, as defined by the leaderships and the strongest interest groups within a given state or by others, within a colonial or hegemonic paradigm.	Shared interests collectively defined.
Order is the value to be pursued.	Plurality (or the right to disagree) is the value to be pursued
Instrumental discourse as a tool to impose its own policy.	Dialogic discourse to create a framework for common deliberation.

2004-03-11

**Assumptions of the discourse on security**
Disorder is a fundamental component of international life. Fear and danger necessarily grow from this disorder.	Disorder is a fundamental component of international life. From disorder may grow fear and danger, but also opportunities of cooperation.
Domestic analogy: the international arena corresponds to a pre-contractual state of nature.	Domestic analogy: the international arena corresponds to a pre-contractual state of nature.
Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war. War is a constant possibility.	Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war, but war is only an extreme case of international intercourses.
Individuals are functions of statuality's needs.	Statuality is a function of citizens' needs.

**What security is about**
Territorial integrity of the state and protection of the values expressed by the community living within its borders.	Personal integrity and protection of every human being's "borders" of dignity and respect.
The interplay of geopolitical realities embodied in the states. They are given facts, subject to change (geographical position, demography, energetic sources, raw materials) but in any case measurable in a quantitative terms.	Ever changing challenges coming from the internal and international realm (environmental issues, ethnic tensions, minorities, immigration, financial instability)
Mastering change.	Coping with change.

**The means through which security is granted**
The use of force in the international arena.	The juridification of international space through norms, rules, institutions, and loyalties. Coertion can be centralized or decentralized (Kelsen).
Temporary equilibria between states based on given patterns of relationship such as hegemony and the balance of power, etc	Viability of social,economic and technological constellations (whether formalized or unformal, regimes) based on an efficient and fair distribution of wealth and justice for all men and women (international society as a civitas maxima).
Alliances as the most effective way to cope with fear and desorder.	Regionalization intended as a process towards intergovernamental/supranational cooperation to cope with the problems of wealth and justice or towards functional/ruling cooperation to cope with technological progresses.
In the internal realm, absolute sovereignty increases the possibility to wage an efficient use of force and, therefore, increases the chances of survival of its community into the international arena (Hobbes)	In the internal realm, the de-absolutization of sovereignty is the best guarantee for the security of the citizen - juridification, divisions of power, spacial articulation (federalism), democratization (Kant, Locke)

**The rethoric of security**
The discourses on war (the culture of war)	The discourse on peace (the culture of peace and internationalism)
God as the source of legitimation for the use of force	Legality and rationality as the source of legitimation for the use of force. However, war is considered to be unthinkable within a security system recognized as legitimate by its members.
National interests, as defined by the leaderships and the strongest interest groups within a given state.	National interests, as defined by others, a paradigm (whether colonial or cold war) built up elsewhere.
Order is the value to be pursued.	Plurality (or the right to disagree) is the value to be pursued

www.gutenberg.net

A project that digitalizes and makes freely available classics whose copyright has expired.

Metalogue: Why Do Things Get in a Muddle? (1948), in Gregory Bateson, Steps to an ecology of mind, Chicago London, The University of Chicago Press,1972

pp. 3-8.

Daughter: Daddy, why do things get in a muddle?
Father: What do you mean? Things? Muddle?
D: Well, people spend a lot of time tidying things, but they never seem to spend time muddling them. Things just seem to get in a muddle by themselves. And then people have to tidy them up again.
F: But do your things get in a muddle if you don't touch them?
D: No -not if anybody touches them. But is you touch them -or if aybody touches them- they get in a muddle and it's a worse muddle if it isn't me.
F: Yes -that's why I try to keep you from touching the things on my desk. Because my things get in a worse muddle if they are touched by somebody who isn't me.
D: But do people always muddle other people's things? Why do they, Daddy?
F: Now, wait a minute. It's not so simple. First of all, what do you mean by a muddle?
D: I mean -so I can't find things, and so it looks all muddles up. The way it is when nothing is straight-.
F: Well, but are you sure you mean the same thing by muddle that anybody else would mean?
D: But, Daddy, I'm sure I do -because I'm not a very tidy person and if I say things are in a muddle, then I'm sure everybody else would agree with me.
F: All right -but do you think you mean the same thing by "tidy" that other people would? If your mummy makes your things tidy, do you know where to find them?
D: Hmmm ... sometimes -because, you see, I know where she puts things when she tidies up-
F: Yes, I try to keep her away from tyding my desk, too. I'm sure that she and I don't mean the same thing by "tidy".
D: Daddy, do you and I mean the same thing by "tidy"?
F: I doubt it, my dear -I doubt it.
D: But, Daddy, isn't that a funny thing -that everybody means the same when they say "muddled", but everybody means something different by "tidy". But "tidy" is the opposite of "muddled", isn't it?
F: Now we begin to get into more difficult questions. Let's start again from the beginning. You said "Why do things always get in a muddle?". Now we have made a step or two -and let's change the question to "Why do things get in a state which Cathy calls 'not tidy'?" Do you see why I want to make that change?
D:…Yes, I think so -because I have a special meaning for "tidy" then some of other people's "tidies" will look like muddles to me -even of we do agree about most of what we call muddles-
[pp. 3-4]
[Read More!]

2004-03-04

**Assumptions of the discourse on security**
Disorder is a fundamental component of life and of the international system (descriptive part of the assumption). Fear and danger grow necessarily from this disorder. Order is the value to be pursued. Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war. War is a constant possibility.	Disorder is a fundamental component of life, national and international communities (descriptive part of the assumption). From disorder may grow fear and danger, but also opportunities of cooperation. Plurality (or the right to disagree) is the value to be pursued Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war, but war is only an extreme case to solve international controversies.
Individuals are functions of statuality's needs.	Statuality is a function of citizens' needs.

**What security is about**
Mastering change.	Coping with change.
Territorial integrity of the state and protection of the values expressed by the community living within its borders.	Personal integrity and protection of every human being's "borders" of dignity and respect.
Geopolitical realities of a country, which are given facts, subject to change (geographical position, demography, energetic sources, raw materials) but in any case measurable in a quantitative terms.	Ever changing challenges coming from the internal and international realm (environmental issues, ethnic tensions, minorities, immigration, financial instability)

**The means through which security is granted**
In the internal realm, absolute sovereignty increases the possibility to wage an efficient use of force and, therefore, increases the chances of survival of its community into the international arena (Hobbes)	In the internal realm, the de-absolutization of sovereignty is the best guarantee for the security of the citizen - juridification, divisions of power, spacial articulation (federalism), democratization [Kant, Locke]
The use of force in the international arena.	The juridification of international space through the creation of international institutions to guarantee universal human rights or through decentralized sanctions (Kelsen).
Temporary equilibrium between states based on given patterns of relationship such as hegemony and the balance of power, etc	Viability of social and economic constellations based on an equal distribution of wealth and justice for all men and women (international society as a civitas maxima).
Alliances as the most effective way to cope with fear and desorder.	Regionalization intended as a process towards intergovernamental/supranational cooperation to cope with the problems of wealth and justice or towards functional/ruling cooperation to cope with technological progresses.

**The rethoric of security**
The discourses on war (the culture of war)	The discourse on peace (the culture of peace and internationalism)
God as the source of legitimation for the use of force	Legality and rationality as the source of legitimation for the use of force. However, war is considered to be unthinkable within a security system recognized as legitimate by its members.
National interests, as defined by the leaderships and the strongest interest groups within a given state.	National interests, as defined by others, a paradigm (whether colonial or cold war) built up elsewhere.

Norberto Bobbio, L'età dei diritti, Torino, Einaudi, 1997 (I ed. 1990)

dall'"Introduzione":
"(...) i diritti non nascono tutti in una volta. Nascono quando devono o possono nascere. Nascono quando l'aumento del potere dell'uomo sull'uomo, che segue inevitabilmente al progresso tecnico, cioè al progresso della capacità dell'uomo di dominare la natura e gli altri uomoni, o crea nuove minacce alla libertà dell'individuo oppure consente nuovi rimedi ala sua indigenza:minacce cui si contravviene con richieste di limiti del potere; rimedi cui si provvede con la richiesta allo stesso potere di interventi protettivi. Alle prime corrispondono i diritti di libertà a un non fare dlelo stato, ai secondi, i diritti sociali o a un fare positivo dello stato. per quanto le richieste dei diritti possano essere disposte cronologicamente in diverse fasi, o generazioni, le loro specie sono sempre, rispetto ai poteri costituiti, soltanto due: o impedirne i malefici o ottenenerne i benefici. Nei diritti della terza e della quarta generazione vi possono essere diritti tanto dlel'una quanto dell'altra specie" (p.XV).

John Locke, Two Treaties of Government [1692],

The text is provisionally reproduced in the Italian version (Trattato sul governo, a cura di Lia Formigari, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1997.

Entire text freely available in English at: http://www.gutenberg.net/browse/BIBREC/BR7370.HTM

XV, "I poteri paterno, politico e dispotico considerati congiuntamente"
171. In secondo luogo, il potere politico è quel potere che ogni uomo possedeva nello stato di natura e che ha ceduto alla società e, dunque ai governanti che essa ha preposto a se stessa con l'impegno tacito o espresso che fosse usato per il loro bene e per la conservazione della loro proprietà. (...). Dunque, in quanto fine e criterio di questo potere è la conservazione di tutta la società, cioè del genere umano in generale, esso non può avere altro fine o criterio, quand'è affidato alle mani del governante, se non di garantire ai membri di quella società la vita, la libertà e i beni. Non può trattarsi dunque d'un potere assoluto e arbitrario sulla loro vita e sul loro partimonio, che devono essere quanto più possibile conservati, ma del potere di emanare leggi -e comminare relative pene- tali da contribuire alla sopravvivenza della totalità, da cui vanno amputate quelle parti, e quelle sotanto, che minacciano le parti integre e sane: questo è il solo rigore legittimo. E questo potere ha origine solo da un contratto e accordo e dal reciproco consesno di coloro che costituiscono la comunità" (p.125)
VI "Il potere paterno"
VI. "Libertà significa infatti essere esenti dall'altrui oppressione e violenza, ciò che non può darsi ove non vi sia legge, ma non libertà per ciascuno di far ciò che vuole (chi potrebbe esser libero, se chiunque potesse esercitare il suo capriccio su di lui?), bensì libertà di disporre e usare della sua persona, delle sue azioni, dei suoi beni e di tutte le sue proprietà entro i confini delle leggi cui è soggetto e in cui non sottostà all'altrui abritrio ma è libero di seguire la volontà propria". (p. 43)

Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy (Avalon Project - Yale)

http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/avalon.htm

The Avalon Project is dedicated to providing access via the World Wide Web to primary source materials in the fields of Law, History, Economics, Politics, Diplomacy and Government.

The Internet Classics Archive (MIT)

http://classics.mit.edu/

Select from a list of 441 works of classical literature by 59 different authors, including user-driven commentary and "reader's choice" Web sites. Mainly Greco-Roman works (some Chinese and Persian), all in English translation.

Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968 (ed. origi. 1962)

"[...]while wealth measures the amount of a nations' material possessions, and power its ability to control the action of others, security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threat to acquired values, in a sujective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked". [Read More!]

English School of International Relations Theory

http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/papers.htm

Martin Wight, Western Values in International Relations, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (ed), Diplomatic Investigation, London, George Allen a

"Between the opposing positions of non-interventionism and interventionsm, there is a central doctrine of what might be called the moral interdependence of peoples, which its holders would claim to be based on the requirements of social existance and true to the constant experience of diplomatic life. 'States are not isolated bodies' as Webster has put it simply 'but part of an international community and the events which take place in each of them must be of interest and concern to all the rest'. The doctrine might for convenience be reduced to the following points:
1.The intervention, in the sense of unwelcome interference by one member of the community of states in the internal affairs of another, is an occasional necessity in international relations, because of the permanent instability of the balance of power and the permanent inequality in the moral development of its members.
2. That it is an unfortunate necessity, because it conflicts with the right of independence; and it should be the exception rather than the rule.
3.That in a moral scale, to maintain the balance of power is a better reason for intervening than to uphold civilized standards, but to uphold civilized standards is a better reason than to maintain existing governments.
These principles postulate the existence of an international society of which states are the immediate but men the ultimate members" (p. 116).

Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, Houndmills, London, 2002 (I ed. 1977)

"Order in social life is desirable because it is the condition of the realisation of other values. Unless there is a pattern of human activities that sustains elementary, primary and universal goals of social life, it will not be possibile to achieve or preserve objectives that are advanced, secondary or the special goals of particular societies. International order, or order within the society of states, is the condition of justice or equality among states or nations; except in a acontext of international order there can ben no such thing as the equal rights of states to independence or of nations to govern themselves. World order, or order in the great society of all mankind, is simalarly the condition of realisation of goals of human or of cosmopolitan justice; if there is not a certain minimum of security against violenece, respect for undertakings and stability of rules of property, goals of political, social and economic justice for individual men or of a just distribution of burdens and rewards in relation to the world common good can have no meaning" (p.93).

"Yet, international order is preserved by means which systematically affront the most basic and widely agreed principles of international justice. I do not mean simply that at the present time there are states and nations which are denied their moral rights or fail to fulfil their moral responsibilities, or that there is goss inequality or unfairness in their enjoyment of these rights, or exercise of responsibilities. This is of course the case, but it has always been the case, and it is the normal condition of any society. What I have in mind is rather that the instituions and mechanisms which sustain international order, even when they are working properly, indeed especially when they are working properly, or fulfilling their functions (...) necessarily violate ordinary notions of justice". (p. 87)

Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do", Millennium, vol.30, n.1, pp. 19-39

The authors favour a re-evaluation of the so-called English School, not so much because it places itself in between the two classic traditions of thinking in International Relations (IR), Realism and Liberalism, but because it tries to build a "coherent framework for theoretical and methodological pluralism" (p. 36). Pluralism is reached through the threefold division of IR attributed by the authors to Bull (and rooted, in Bull's words, on Martin Wight's approach):
-the international system (or system of states, where a Hobbesian power politics dominates the relationship among states;
-the international society, which draws inspiration from Grotius and put in the center of IR the "instituionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states" and the "creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions" (p. 36;
-the world society, where Kant's universalism works in the sense that individuals and not the states are "the focus of global social identities and arrangements" (p. 36)

Dichotomies in 26/01/2004

**Assumptions of the discourse on security**
Disorder is a fundamental component of life and of the international system (descriptive part of the assumption). Danger and insecurity grow necessarily from this disorder. Order is the value to be pursued. Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war. War is a constant possibility. Therefore, the most effective way to cope with this instability is to prepare for war (internal realm) and to impose order through direct or indirect violence (at the international level) - balance of power, hegemonic empire etc).	Disorder is a fundamental component of life, national and international communities (descriptive part of the assumption). From disorder may grow danger, insecurity and violence, but also opportunities of cooperation. Plurality (or the right to disagree) is the value to be pursued Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war and war is an extreme case to solve international controversies. The best way to cope with the instability of the international system is to increase international tools to master disorder (international jurisdictions, organizations, ...)and to increase the effectiveness of cooperation within a given international community.
Individuals are functions of statuality's needs.	Statuality is a function of citizens' needs.

**What security is about**
Mastering change through violence (polemos).	Coping with change through contractual rules.
The integrity of (and menaces directed to) the state territory, of physical border and values expressed by the communities that live within this borders.	The integrity of (and menaces directed to) the human being, of his/her « borders » of dignity and respect.
Security and the means to achieve it are deeply rooted in the geopolitical realities of a country, which are given facts, not subject to change (geographical position, demography, energetic sources, raw materials)	Security and the means to achieve it are deeply rooted in the ever changing challenges coming from the internal and international realm (environmental issues, ethnic tensions, immigration)

**The means through which security is granted**
In the internal realm, absolute sovereignty increases the possibility to wage an efficient use of force and, therefore, increases the chances of survival of its community into the international arena (Hobbes)	In the internal realm, the de-absolutization of sovereignty is the best guarantee for the security of the citizen - juridification, divisions of power, spacial articulation (federalism), democratization [Kant, Locke]
The use of force by national or regional actors in the international arena. The creation of rules of the game (Ius in bello, ius ad bellum).	The juridification of international space. Domestication of the international realm. The creation of international institutions to guarantee universal human rights.
Globalisation as the most efficient road to the distribution of global resources and the management of technological issues. But globalisation (mondialisation ) condamns some areas to be forgotten forever ( l'oublie eternel ).	Regionalization as the best way to organize the most efficient use of resources and manage technological progresses. Regionalization and the policies of regionalization change through time and space. Countries which were considered neighbours at the time of Philip II are now distant entities and the reverse

**The rethoric of security**
The discourses on war (the culture of war)	The discourse on peace (the culture of peace and internationalism)
God as the source of legitimation for the use of force	Legality and rationality as the source of legitimation for the use of force. However, war is considered to be unthinkable within a security system recognized as legitimate by its members.
National interests, as defined by the leaderships and the strongest interest groups within a given state.	National interests, as defined by others, a paradigm (whether colonial or cold war) built up elsewhere.

John G. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends in International Organizations, Vol 29, n°3, 1975, pp. 557-84

Danilo Zolo, I signori della pace. Una critica del globalismo giuridico., Roma, Carocci, 2001 (prima edizione 1998)

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (ed. or. 1651),

Entire text freely available at: http://www.gutenberg.net/browse/BIBREC/BR3207.HTM

"But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, bacuse of their independencey, are in continull jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another(...). But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men. To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law; where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice, are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. (...)The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth convenient Artciles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Law of Nature(...)". (pp. 65-66)

"The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in Commonwealth,) is the forsait of their own preservation, and of a more contented live thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of warre, which is necessarily consequent [...] to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observations of those Lawes of Nature [...].
For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to,) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strenght to secure a men at all". (p. 87

Raymond Aron, Qu'est-ce qu'une théorie des Relations Internationales, Revue française des sciences politiques, vol 17 n° 5, Octobre 1967, pp. 837-861

Stanley Hoffmann, Théorie et relations internationales, Revue française vol. 11 n° 2, 1961, pp. 413-433

"[...] pour fonder une discipline, il faut partir d'une sorte du type idéal, d'une represéntation de l'essence des phénomènes à étudier, et qui les distingue d'autres phénomènes, quitte à analyser par la suite les cas dans lesquels des rapprochements s'opèrent. Ce type idéal est le point de departe de toute théorie. Celui de la science politique 'interne' contemporaine c'est le modèle de la société integrée à la fois communauté (c'est-à-dire accord inconditionnel des membres pour coopérer, division du travail poussée, croyance en un bien commun plus ou moins largement, plus au moins clairement défini) et Pouvoir (c'est-à-dire monopole de l'usage légitime de la violence par l'Etat, exercé directement sur les individus). Le modèle dont doit partir la théorie des relations internationals, c'est celui de milieu décentralisé, divisé en unités distinctes, c'est-à-dire un milieu qui n'est pas pour l'essentiel une communaute ( au mieux, une societé, c'est à dire que la cooperation y est limitée et conditionnelle, et que la allegéance des membres s'adresse aux groupes distincts plutôt qu'à l'ensemble qu'il constitue; o pire un chant de bataille) et qui n'est pas doté d'un pouvoir central (du le recours légitime à la violence par chaque unité et l'absence d'authorité directe sur les individus dans les institutions etabli entre les unités). [...]". [Read More!]

Dichotomies in 15/01/2004

**Assumption of the discourse on security**
Desorder is a fundamental component of life, national and international communities (descriptive part of the assumption). Danger and insecurity grow necessarily from this desorder. Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war. Therefore, the most effective way to cope with this instability is to prepare for war (internal realm) and to impose order through violence (at the international level) - balance of power, hegemonic empire etc).	Desorder is a fundamental component of life, national and international communities (descriptive part of the assumption). From desorder may grow danger, insecurity and violence, but also opportunities of cooperation. The best way to cope with this instability is to increase international tools to master desorder (international jurisdictions, organizations, ...)and to increase the effectivness of cooperation, make it work and make the war unthinkable - multilateralism, regionalism
Individuals are functions of statuality's needs.	Statuality is a function of citizens' needs.

**What security is about**
Master change through violence (polemos).	Coping with change through contractual rules.
The integrity of (and menaces directed to) the state territory, of physical border and values expressed by the communities that live within this borders.	The integrity of (and menaces directed to) the human being, of his/her « borders » of dignity and respect.

**The means through which security is granted**
In the internal realm, absolute sovereignity increases the possibility to wage an efficient use of force and, therefore, increases the chances of survival of its community into the international arena (Hobbes)	In the internal realm, the de-absolutization of sovereignity is the best guarantee for the security of the citizen - juridification, divisions of power, spacial articulation (federalism), democratization [Kant, Locke]
The use of force in the international arena.The creation of rules of the game (Ius in bello, ius ad bellum).	The juridification of international space.The creation of international institutions to guarantee universal human rights.
Each discourse on security is deeply rooted in the geographical realities of a country, which are given facts, not subject to change. Globalisation (mondialisation ) condams some areas to be forgotten forever ( l'oublie eternel ).	Each discourse on security is built on regionalization, and the policies of regionalization change through time and space. Countries which were considered neighbours at the time of Philip II are now distant entities and the reverse

**The rethoric of security**
The discourses on war (the culture of war)	The discourse on peace (the culture of peace and internationalism)
God as the source of legitimation for the use of force	Legality and rationality as the source of legitimation for the use of force. However, war is considered to be unthinkable within a security system recognized as legitimate by its members.
National interests, as defined by the leaderships and the strongest interest groups within a given state.	National interests, as defined by others, a paradigm (whether colonial or cold war) built up elsewhere.

Norberto Bobbio, Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1979

"La guerra moderna viene a porsi al di fuori di ogni possibile criterio di legittimazione e di legalizzazione, al di là di ogni principio di legittimità e di legalità. Essa è incontrollata e incontrollabile dal diritto, come un terremoto o come una tempesta. Dopo esser stata considerata ora come un mezzo per attuare il diritto (teoria della guerra giusta) ora come oggetto di regolamentazione giuridica (nell'evoluzione del ius belli) la guerra ritorna ad essere, come nella raffigurazione hobbesiama dello stato di natura, l'antitesi del diritto" [Read More!]

Dichotomies in 17/12/2003

**Assumption of the discourse on security**
Desorder is a fundamental component of life, national and internation communities (descriptive part of the assumption). The problem is how to impose order (prescriptive part of the assumption). World is dominated by the constant possibility of change. Change can take the form of war (polemos). Nothing exists in the international realm to prevent war.Therefore, the best way to cope with this instability is to prepare for war (internal realm) and to master this desorder through stable equilibria (at the international level) - balance of power, hegemonic empire etc).	Desorder is a fundamental component of life, national and international communities (descriptive part of the assumption). The problem is how to master this desorder (prescriptive part of the assumption). This desorder is dominated by the constant possibility of change. Change can take the form of war. But it can also take other forms (collaboration). The best way to cope with this instability is to increase the effectivness of cooperation, make it work and make the war unthinkable – multilateralism, regionalism

**What security is about**
The integrity of the state territories, of physical border and values expressed by the communities that live within this borders.	The integrity of the human being, of his/her « borders » of dignity and respect.
Individuals are functions of statuality’s needs. Menaces to the security of state (and its citizens intended as an organic body), therefore come mainly from the international realm.	Statuality is a function of citizens’ needs. Menaces to the security of citizens, therefore, come from every level of territoriality/sovereignity (local, national and international)

**The means through which security is granted**
In the internal realm, absolute sovereignity increases the possibility to wage an efficient use of force and, therefore, increases the chances of survival of its community into the international arena (Hobbes)	In the internal realm, the de-absolutization of sovereignity is the best guarantee for the security of the citizen - juridification, divisions of power, spacial articulation (federalism), democratization [Kant, Locke]
The use of force in the international arena.The creation of rules of the game (Ius in bello, ius ad bellum).	The juridification of international space.The creation of international institutions to guarantee universal human rights.
Each discourse on security is deeply rooted in the geographical realities of a country, which are given facts, not subject to change. Globalisation (mondialisation ) condams some areas to be forgotten forever ( l'oublie eternel ).	Each discourse on security is built on regionalization, and the policies of regionalization change through time and space. Countries which were considered neighbours at the time of Philip II are now distant entities and the reverse

**The rethoric of security**
The discourses on war (the culture of war)	The discourse on peace (the culture of peace and internationalism)
God as the source of legitimation for the use of force	Legality and rationality as the source of legitimation for the use of force. However, war is considered to be unthinkable within a security system recognized as legitimate by its members.
National interests, as defined by the leaderships and the strongest interest groups within a given state.	National interests, as defined by others, a paradigm (whether colonial or cold war) built up elsewhere.

Zaki Laïdi (sous la dir. de), Géopolitique du sens, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1998

The book offers an encompassing view of the concept of regionalization, too often reduced to its economic dimension. The authors refer to "espaces de sens" as "espaces aux frontières incertaines mais désireux d'exprimer une identité collective singulière à des fins de différenciacion indentitaire, de pesée politique, de rationalisation économique, voire même de légitimation politique interne" (Introduction, par Zaki Laïdi, p. 9).
They are not "espace public régionaux", if, with this expression, we mean "une sphère symbolique de représentation et de délibération fondée sur la citoyenneté et traduisant l'existence de sociétés civiles constituées sur une base transnationale" (p. 35).

The word "geopolitique" expresses the idea that a deliberative space (see later) is constituted not so much on sharing a common view on a special question, but on thinking that a regional frame is the best to solve problems emerging at different moments (p.37).

Conceptually, an "espace de sens" is situated between the "national, fonctionellement insuffisant, mais identitairement irreplaçable, et une mondialisation fonctionellement indépassable, mais identitairement insatisfaisante" (p.11).

From an epistemological point of view, the author builds its concept on the incommensurability of systems (pp. 26-27)-see Kuhn's paradigms. As Rorty says, it is impossibile to find common roots (fondement commun) for human beings, as the idea of roots (fondement) relates to specific metaphisical visions of the world (p. 27). This stands at the basis of today's relativism, which can easily lead to a inward-looking attitude (if I can no more shape the world following my universal views, I stop caring about the others.

Un espace de sens is not necessarily institutionalized nor it has to express a common project ("Un espace de sens peut traduire des dynamiques sociales et économiques plutôt qu'un projet", p. 10). Moreover, the dynamics of its construction can follow different patterns -from the institutional to the economic, from the cosial to the cultural etc.

Three dynamics take place in an espace de sens:
-the first has to do with the creation of a deliberative espace, where public and private actors can intervene to put in place and solve problems requiring common solutions (the number of common problems and actors is relevant to define the importance of this deliberative space, i-e- tariffs reduction or environmental issues)(pp.35-36)
-the second deals with the production of collective preferences which differentiate this space from others within the international arena (the European social model, the Asian values) (p.36)
-the third deals with the capacity to translate these deliberations and preferences in political performances, ce que l'on pourrait appeler l'obligation de résultats (p. 36).

In the first context, the role of institutions is fundamental, because they grant stability and the possibility to think (p. 37; here Laïdi cites Vincent Descombes, Les institutions du sens, Paris, Éd. de Minuit, 1996, p. 296). At the same time, a deliberative space must have some minimal democratic and legal guarantees ("sans le retour de la démocratie en Amérique Latine, le Mercosur aurait été impensable", p. 38.
[Read More!]

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Centro EURO-MED

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Dichotomies in 26/01/2004

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Dichotomies in 15/01/2004

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Dichotomies in 17/12/2003

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